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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
requirements that a certain number of the attesting witnesses
be able to sign their names, the number being tailored to the
type of will.8 0 The additional requirements do not exclude ap-
plication of article 1592 to testaments governed by the Civil Code,
so it may well be doubted that the amendment should be con-
strued as having that effect with regard to statutory wills.
The court advanced each of the arguments discussed above
but neglected to mention on which of the three it based its hold-
ing. Although none of the lines of reasoning seems adequate to
justify the decision, the court may reasonably have concluded
that its result was in accordance with a liberal interpretation
of the statutory will. Nonetheless, the decision is regrettable in
that it denies effect to an important safeguard for the proper
confection of testaments and casts doubt on the applicability of
the Civil Code's scheme to the statutory will.
W. Marshall Shaw
AN UNLOADED AND UNWORKABLE PISTOL AS A DANGEROUS
WEAPON WHEN USED IN A ROBBERY
The defendant was charged with armed robbery. While
conceding that the revolver he used in the robbery was unloaded
and not capable of being fired, the state argued that it was
nevertheless a dangerous weapon. In affirming the conviction,
the supreme court held, one who commits robbery by pointing
an unloaded and unworkable pistol' at the victim can be found
guilty of armed robbery. State v. Levi, 250 So.2d 751 (La. 1971).
R.S. 14:64(A) defines armed robbery as "the theft of any-
thing of value . . . while armed with a dangerous weapon."'2 A
dangerous weapon is defined in R.S. 14:2(3) as any "instru-
mentality, which, in the manner used, is calculated or likely to
produce death or great bodily harm."
In the instant case the supreme court has, for the first time,
interpreted R.S. 14:2(3) 4 in relation to the commission of an
30. LA. Civ. CODH arts. 1580, 1582, 1587.
1. The court in reaching the decision makes no distinction between a
gun which is unloaded and one which is unworkable, but rather treats these
conditions as being equivalent. The courts of other states have handled
this problem In a similar manner. See note 11 infra.




armed robbery. However, the court has interpreted the statute
in criminal assault cases on several occasions prior to the instant
decision. This jurisprudence, with one exception, 5 stresses the
manner in which the weapon was actually used in determining
whether it was dangerous. 6 These cases emphatically reject the
inherent nature of the instrumentality as a test and appear to
follow the statutory standard closely by requiring an objective
test of whether the weapon, in the manner in which it was used,
placed the victim in actual danger of losing his life or suffering
great bodily harm.7 It should be noted however that none of these
cases dealt with a firearm.8
In contrast, State v. Johnstong held that assault with a
dangerous weapon occurred when the defendant pointed and
clicked an unloaded pistol while threatening to kill the persons
present. The court reasoned that the persons against whom the
threat was directed could assume the gun would fire and that
such a situation invites escape, retaliation or rescue, any of
which could lead to serious injury or death for the assailant,
the victims or innocent third persons. Thus, following this
reasoning, a pistol is a dangerous weapon not only because of
its actual capacity to inflict harm, but also because of the psycho-
logical impact upon the victims caused by the presence of the
pistol. Logically then, a pistol is an inherently dangerous weapon
irrespective of its condition or the manner in which it is used.
5. State v. Johnston, 207 La. 161, 20 So.2d 741 (1946); Note, 6 LA. L. REV.
294 (1945). See text accompanying note 9 infra.
6. State v. Murff, 215 La. 40, 39 So.2d 817 (1949) (mower blade held to
be a dangerous weapon when used in an assault); State v. Reynolds, 209
La. 455, 24 So.2d 818 (1945) (a beer bottle held to be a dangerous weapon);
State v. Penton, 157 La. 68, 102 So. 14 (1924) (scantling, a piece of timber,
held to be a dangerous weapon).
7. See State v. Murff, 215 La. 40, 39 So.2d 817 (1949); State v. Reynolds,
209 La. 455, 24 So.2d 818 (1945). In these cases the court disregards inherent
nature as a factor in determining whether an instrumentality is a dangerous
weapon under the statute. The court expresses the test as whether the
instrumentality, when used in the manner in which it was used, placed the
victim in actual danger of death or serious bodily injury. Inherent nature
refers to the intrinsic character of the object; for example, a tool, a piece
of wood, a weapon. Capability refers to the potentiality of a thing to be
used for a purpose, for example, an object to be a potential bludgeon must
have a certain weight and hardness. The statute presumes that the Instru-
mentality used had the capability of Inflicting death or serious bodily injury
and then requires an inquiry as to whether the instrumentality possessing
this capability was used in a manner which was calculated or likely to
inflict the injury. Thus capability is always a factor under the statute
while the inherent nature of the object is Irrelevant. The court In Le%4
fails to distinguish between these terms.
8. See note 6 supra.
9. 207 La. 161, 20 So.2d 741 (1945).
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The court apparently formulates a subjective test with the
inquiry directed toward determining if the weapon placed the
particular victim in fear of losing his life. This test seems to
contravene the objective statutory standard which requires the
victim to be placed in actual danger.
The courts of other states which have confronted the ques-
tion have generally, with one notable exception, 10 found that an
unloaded or unworkable gun is a dangerous weapon." The pre-
vailing rationale in these jurisdictions bears a strong resemblance
to that used by our supreme court in the instant case. The general
result reached is that the presence of a gun at the scene of a
robbery makes the likelihood of violence and the seriousness of
that violence so great that, based upon public policy, any pistol
used in a robbery is a dangerous weapon as a matter of law.12
This policy is so strong in some jurisdictions that convictions
have been brought in for the use of objects that are not true
firearms at all, but mere facsimiles.'3
The federal courts have on several occasions dealt with the
10. Luitze v. State, 204 Wis. 78, 234 N.W. 382 (1931), overruled legislatively
by Wis. STAT. § 939.22(10) (1955), which provides, in pertinent part: "Danger-
ous weapon means any firearm, whether loaded or unloaded ......
11. See, e.g., State v. Reed, 159 Conn. 464, 254 A.2d 449 (1969); People v.
Roden, 21 N.Y.2d 810, 235 N.E.2d 776, 288 N.Y.S.2d 638 (1968); State v.
Ashland, 259 Iowa 728, 145 N.W.2d 910 (1966); State v. McLean, 192 N.E.2d
208 (Ohio 1962); State v. Montano, 69 N.M. 332, 367 P.2d 95 (1961); Turner
v. State, 300 S.W.2d 920 (Tenn. 1957); Hayes v. State, 211 Md. 111, 126 A.2d 576
(1956); Commonwealth v. Nickologines, 322 Mass. 274, 76 N.E.2d 649 (1948);
People v. Ash, 88 Cal. App. 2d 819, 199 P.2d 711 (1948); Moore v. Common-
wealth, 260 Ky. 437, 86 S.W.2d 145 (1935). The courts in these cases do not
appear to be interpreting a statutory definition of a dangerous weapon, but
rather seem to rely on common law concepts.
12. Turner v. State, 300 S.W.2d 920 (Tenn. 1957); Hayes v. State, 211
Md. 111, 126 A.2d 576 (1956); Moore v. Commonwealth, 260 Ky. 437, 86
S.W.2d 145 (1935). The courts of California have advanced the rationale
that a gun Is a dangerous weapon per se because it can easily be used
as a bludgeon. Unlike Louisiana, California does not have a statutory
definition of a dangerous weapon; the CALIF. PENAL CODE § 211(a) (Deering
1959) prohibits robbery with a dangerous weapon, but the defining of a dan-
gerous weapon is left to the courts. In People v. Freeman, 86 Cal. App. 374, 260
P. 826 (1927), the rationale that a gun is a dangerous weapon because It
can easily be used as a bludgeon was first put forth. In that case the
robber did not threaten or even indicate that he would use the gun as a
bludgeon, and did not come closer than thirteen feet to the victim; however,
the court reasoned that since the weapon had the capability to be used as
a bludgeon, the culprit had the present ability to so use the weapon if he
desired, and robbers did at times use pistols as bludgeons, the pistol was a
dangerous weapon. This reasoning seems rather tenuous but has been
heavily relied upon by the California courts.
13. Jackson v. State, 231 Md. 591, 191 A.2d 432 (1963) (a starter's pistol).
But see Cooper v. State, 297 S.W.2d 75 (Tenn. 1956), where the Tennessee
Supreme Court found a toy pistol Is not a dangerous weapon when used
in a robbery.
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problem posed in State v. Levi. All of the circuits which have
examined the statutes forbidding armed bank and mail robbery
have interpreted them strictly, ruling that the victim must have
been placed in actual danger as a result of the use of a weapon.14
In order to avoid having the construction of the statutes place an
intolerable burden of proof on the prosecution, the federal courts
have devised several procedural devices which, in effect, shift
the burden of proof to the defense. The most prevalent method
is to permit the jury to infer that the weapon was in fact dan-
gerous, and thus that the victim was in actual danger." The
Eighth Circuit constructs a rebuttable presumption that any gun
used in a robbery places the victim in actual danger.10 The Fifth
Circuit has recently taken the position that, as a matter of law,
when a gun is used in a robbery the victims are placed in a state
of danger regardless of whether it was loaded.1'7 This position
apparently places the Fifth Circuit in conflict with the other
circuits which employ an objective test. However the strong
language is somewhat suspect because the court uses more force
than necessary to achieve the result it seeks. These decisions
come in response to requests by the defense that the prosecution
be forced to prove that an objective state of danger in fact ex-
isted. It remains to be seen whether the 5th Circuit will adhere
to its position when confronted with proof by the defense that
the gun did not pose an objective threat, especially in light of the
fact that the court continues to rely on Smith v. United States"8
which employs an objective test.
14. Morrow v. United States, 408 F.2d 1390 (8th Cir. 1969) (bank robbery
with sawed-off shotguns); United States v. Roach, 321 F.2d (3d Cir. 1963)
(robbery of a savings and loan association with a revolver); Smith v. United
States, 284 F.2d 789 (5th Cir. 1960) (mail robbery with the use of a gun
and knives); United States v. Donovan, 242 F.2d 61 (2d Cir. 1957) (mail
robbery with a revolver).
15. United States v. Marshall, 427 F.2d 434 (2d Cir. 1970); Evalt v.
United States, 382 F.2d 424 (9th Cir. 1967); Lewis v. United States, 365
F.2d 672 (10th Cir. 1966); United States v. Roach, 321 F.2d 1 (3d Cir. 1963);
Wagner v. United States, 264 F.2d 524 (9th Cir. 1959).
16. Wheeler v. United States, 317 F.2d 615 (8th Cir. 1963). But see
Morrow v. United States, 408 F.2d 1390 (8th ir. 1969), where the court
speaks of the jury inferring that the gun was loaded. This may Indicate
the Eighth Circuit is abandoning the rebuttable presumption in favor of
the inference used by the other circuits.
17. Baker v. United States, 412 F.2d 1069 (5th Cir. 1969); Thomas v.
United States, 418 F.2d 567 (5th Cir. 1969).
18. 284 F.2d 789 (5th Cir. 1960). The court discussed the test used in
this case In these terms: "In this atmosphere we do not believe that a
jury could have been confused as to the meaning of 'putting in jeopardy
the life' of the victims. Here at least the jury would resaonably consider
1971]
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The rationale in State v. Levi is precisely the same as that
in State v. Johnston;19 in fact, a large portion of the Johnston2
decision is quoted by Justice Sanders. The court felt that the use
of a gun to commit robbery creates a situation that is so highly
charged with the likelihood of violence that the use of any sort
of gun is condemned. The gun is a dangerous weapon, not be-
cause of its ability to inflict harm, but because it is a catalyst
that is likely to precipitate violent reaction. This reaction to the
use of a gun is likely to result in injury or death to the culprit,
the victim, or to third persons.
The decision in Levi is entirely proper if viewed as an ex-
pression of the public policy against the use of firearms in crimi-
nal activity. However this decision does not seem in accord with
the statutory definition of a dangerous weapon. The statute re-
quires that the weapon be used in such a manner as to place the
victim in actual danger of losing his life or suffering serious
bodily injury. This definition clearly contemplates that the capa-
bility of the instrumentality to inflict death or serious injury be
assessed in light of the manner in which it was used,21 an ob-
jective test.
Although the instant case is consistent with the prior case of
State v. Johnston,22 it conflicts with the weight of the jurispru-
dence interpreting R.S. 14:2(3)28 which follows the statutory
standard closely and provides that the victim must have been
actually placed in danger by the weapon in the manner in which
it was used. Since Johnston24 and Levi are the only cases in-
volving firearms, the court obviously views firearms as so in-
herently dangerous that public policy forbids their use in any
criminal endeavor regardless of their condition.
The court advances two additional rationales to buttress its
that the usual meaning was likewise the law's meaning-life was in peril,
not merely thought to be. Nothing said or unsaid in the balance of the
charge could possibly have been interpreted to mean or even suggest that
the jury could evaluate it in terms of the subjective fears of the two
victims. The test laid down was the objective one that their lives had to
be in fact in danger." Id. at 792.
19. 207 La. 161, 20 So.2d 741 (1945). See note 9 supra and accompanying
text.
20. State v. Johnston, 207 La. 161, 20 So.2d 741 (1945).
21. See note 7 supra and accompanying text.
22. 207 La. 161, 20 So.2d 741 (1945).
23. IA. R.S. 14:2(3) (1950) defines a dangerous weapon as "any . . .
instrumentality, which, in the manner used, is calculated or likely to
produce death or great bodily harm."
24. State v. Johnston, 207 La. 161, 20 So.2d 741 (1945).
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conclusion: First, that a pistol also has the capability of being
used as a bludgeon25 and second, that to decide this case otherwise
would make the task of law enforcement impossible because to
secure a conviction the robber would almost have to be caught
in the act. The first rationale cannot be supported under the
statutory standard which requires the court to look at how the
weapon actually was used, not how it may have been used.26
Obviously a gun that was only pointed, as in Levi, was not used
as a bludgeon. The second rationale finds little substance in
fact.27 The court, through the use of a rebuttable presumption
or by permitting the jury to infer that the weapon was dangerous,
could achieve the desired policy without hampering law enforce-
ment. As pointed out above, the majority of the federal circuits
take such an approach.28 In addition, the use of these devices
would permit the statutory standard to be more closely followed.
In the instant decision the Supreme Court of Louisiana was
apparently attempting to effectuate the strong public policy
against the use of firearms to commit robbery. This has been
achieved. Unfortunately the vehicle used to reach this result
does severe violence to the language of R.S. 14:2(3) .29 The court
in this decision substitutes a subjective standard, without any
clearly ascertainable limitations, for the clear objective standard
required by the statute. The same policy considerations could
be implemented within the terms of the statute by use of dif-
ferent reasoning. However, if the court does not or cannot ef-
fectuate the policy through other means, the statute should be
amended to properly include the position taken in Levi.
Wilson R. Ramshur
25. The court relies on People v. Ash, 88 Cal. App. 2d 819, 199 P.2d 711
(1948), and makes no reference to the statutory standard in LA. R.S. 14:2(3)
(1950).
26. See note 7 supra and accompanying text.
27. The argument under this rationale would be that if the culprit were
not apprehended during the actual commission of the crime, he would
have time to discard bullets or file down a firing pin. Using an objective test,
the argument continues, the prosecution would have a difficult burden to
carry in proving that the gun was actually dangerous at the time of the
crime.
28. See notes 15 and 16 supra and accompanying text.
29. LA. R.S. 14:2(3) (1950).
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